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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
GILBERT N. ANDERSON and his
wife, ELLA B. ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
vs.

RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF
Case No. 9854

E. VAL ANDERSON,
Defendant, and Appellant
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
FACTS AND NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action to have an escrow contract terminated and title quieted to 133 acres of irrigated
farm land in Cache County, Utah, for failure by the defendant to make payments alleged to be under the terms
of the said contract. ( F -3,) (Court File page 3).
There was no question of forfeiture because there
was no interest charge for the first year under the terms
of the contract, and the $1,000 paid in two payments during the first year was less than the amount of interest
and less than rental value. The record does not contain
a transcript of evidence, but only the preliminary discussion of the Court and counsel when the case was
called for trial when the Court sought to find a compromise so that the defendant would agree to pay for
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-2the property with interest. The discussion was carried
on for a substantial part of the forenoon, during which
time the plaintiffs made offers to reinstate the contract
if an agreement could be reached that would pay for the
land. (Record 4 to 25) No such agreement was reached,
and we take issue with the statement of the appellant
at page two of their brief that plaintiffs stipulated that,
"The defendant had paid all that was required by the
contract.',
The purchase price under the contract for the property was $26,500.00, which sum was agreed to be paid
by the purchaser as follows:
"$500, May 1, 1959; $500, December 1, 1959; $1000,
October 1, 1960; $1,000 each October 1 thereafter
until the full purchase price with interest on all deferred payments at the rate of 4:*% per annum from
January 1, 1960, all payments to be applied first to
the payment of accrued interest to date of payment
and the balance on the principal. Option to buyer
to pay any additional amount at any time." ( F 5)
Plaintiffs contended that the above language should
be considered to mean the payment of $1,000 on the principal, plus interest. The defendant contended that the
language was clear and only required the defendant to
pay $1,000 per year, even though this was not enough to
pay the interest as clearly provided in the language above
quoted. ( R-3)
The case was commenced in August, 1962. (F 1-4)
Before it came to trial, the October payment was due.
At that time the defendant made a written tender of
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-3payment which was set-up by a supplemental complaint
and as additional grounds for terminating the contract
as follows:
4. "That the defendant failed and refused to pay
any part of either of the said payments, but in lieu
thereof the defendant on October 1, 1962, pretended
to tender the sum of $1,000 in currency as of this
date as full payment of the deferred payments provided for under the escrow contract above referred
to be due October 1, 1962. In this connection the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant has no right to
make any such conditional tender, that the contract
gave them no right to make any such conditional
offer. The offer was refused. However, the plaintiffs offered to accept the $1,000 and credit it on the
contract and wait the determination of the court as
to what amounts might be due. Defendant refused
to leave the tender, and Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that tender has not been kept good
or made good." (F-29)
To the above allegation the defendant in his supplemental answer, answered as follows:
3. "Defendant alleges that on the 1st day of October,
1962, the defendant tendered to the plaintiffs, the
sum of of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) cash as
full payment of the deferred payment provided for
under the Escrow Contract due October 1, 1962, and
alleges that the said amount was the full amount due
under said contract, that other than above provided
the defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 4
of the plaintiffs amended and supplemental complaint." ( F23)
The defendant refused to make any payment that
would pay the interest or any part of the principal. This
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-4put the defendant in the place where he, in effect, refused
to buy or pay for the farm, but insisted he had a right
to keep it by paying at the rate of $1,000 per year.
At page 2 of appellant's brief, he states:
"The effect of the contract is basically that of the
yearly payments provided fall short of paying the
interest on the principal If the minimum payments
were made, the defendant would be entitled to possession and the profits from the land perpetually; but
the contract would not be paid out unless the buyer
exercises his option to pay sufficiently more on the
principal so that the payments would more than cover
the interest."

ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED
Did the lower Court err in holding that this contract
for purchase of land, because of the unrestricted option
given to the defendant to pay more at any time, violate
the rule against Perpetuities?

ARGUMENT
The defendant elected to stand on the proposition
that this language is clear and unambiguous, and can have
only one possible meaning, viz. Buyer is required to
pay $1,000 per year on the contract and nothing more.

POINT 1. LOWER COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED THIS CONTRACT.
Plaintiff's contend that there is ambiguity in the
language and that the Court should not permit counsel
to limit the language to tl1e $1,000 payment and "nothing
more." But that the express language used shows that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5the language of the contract expressly and by necessary
and reasonable implication does require more than $1,000
payment each year.
It is to be regretted that the contract does contain
language that can be described as ambiguous.

No one wishes to write a contract which requires
interpretation, and it would be nice if every contract contained just exactly in definite terms all that the parties
intended and no more than was intended. As a practical
matter, very few perfect contracts are written. The
Courts are required to interpret the language used in
contracts for the purpose of determing the intent of the
parties.
In the first place, this was a contract intended to be
a contract of sale by a person willing to sell to a person
willing to purchase and pay the agreed purchase price
for the property.
The difficulty arises out of the language used in attempting to detail the manner and amount of payments
of the purchase price. The contract clearly calls for payment of interest on the deferred payments at the rate of
4~% per annum from January 1, 1960. It further provides
that payment should be applied to payment of accnted
interest and the BALANCE ON THE PRINCIPAL.
The first difficulty with the defendant's claimed construction is that $1,000 a year will not pay the accrued
interest. Interest on $25,640, at the rate of 43~% per
annum is $1150.38. Each year since 1960, the defendant
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-6has refused to pay $150 (in round numbers) interest
accrued on the contract price and nothing on the principaL
The interpretation of defendant does violence to
the language agreeing to pay interest and also to the
additional language "and the balance on the principal."
The net result of defendant's contention is that he would
never even pay the interest provided for and never pay
the principal or any part thereof. Any such construction,
we contend, could not possibly be in accordance with the
intention of the parties and would be void for uncertainty.

If two constructions are possible under the language
of the contract, the Court will adopt the one that is legal
and workable if such can be done without doing violence
to the principles of justice and equity.
The theory of the plaintiffs is that the language means
that the buyer agrees to pay $1,000 per year and the
jnterest provided for in the contract each year. It is our
contention that interest will be presumed to be intended
to be paid unless there is an express provision that no
interest is intended. To require the purchaser in this
case to pay the interest at a modest rate of 4*% per
annum, plus $1,000 on the principal is not only fair, reasonable and just, but allows him the very liberal term of 25
years after January, 1960, to pay for the property. It
was never contended that this was an unreasonable contract.
17 C. J. S. 682 states:
"The law provides certain rules of construction to
aid in determination as to the obligation of parties
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-7under contracts which are ambiguous."
At pages 685-86 it continues:
"A contract is ambiguous when and only when it is
reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions ... even an apparent unambiguous contract may
be rendered ambiguous and open to construction if
its words, taken literally lead to absurity or illegality
when applied to the facts. In determining whether
or not there is such an ambiguity as calls for interpretation, the whole instrument must be considered
and not an isolated part."
At page 689 it further states:
"The primary rule of construction is that the Court
must, if possible, ascertain and give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties as of the time the
contract is made as it may be done without contravening legal principals and statutes or public policy."
The case of Udy vs. Jenson, Utah 1924, 222 Pac.
597-98, 63 U. 94 applies these same rules and concluded a
written contract proporting to be a contract to purchase
the capital stock of a company was a mere option and not
a contract to purchase stock. From this case we quote the
following:
"The provision in the contract that 'this agreement
shall not be binding upon the party of the first part
for any of his property whatsover, but the party of
second part shall hold the certificates of stock until
paid for by the party of the first part' cannot be disregarded because it is a part of the contract and has
a definite signification. By saying that the agreement
shall not be binding upon the first party for any of
his property whatsoever is equivalent to saying that
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-8the agreement to purchase should not be binding
upon him at all because it is only by resort to his property that such an agreement could be enforced
against him. The form of expression is inept and
awkward, but in the light of circumstances and conditions surrounding the parties, the meaning is clear.
The actual intention of the parties must prevail over
dry words, inept expressions and careless recitations
in the contract, unless the intentions are contrary to
the plain sense and the binding words of the agreement."
It is submitted that the foregoing rules of construction should be considered for two purposes, ( 1 ) to give a
general perspective to the litigation that the plaintiff is
not attempting to take technical advantage of the young
purchaser by way of any fodeiture, and ( 2) that the contract cannot be construed to establish an intention between the parties to create the relationship of lessor and
lessee.

POINT 2. COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
CONTRACT VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
Utah has no state statute of the uses, but the common
law rule against perpetuities is recognized as a law of
this state.
70 C. J. S. 577 states the common law rule as follows:
"The rule against perpetuities at common law, is that
no interest within its scope is good unless it vests, if
at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest ... "
It appears now to be conceded that there is nothing
in the contract that title would ever vest in the purchaser
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-9since there is nothing in defendant's interpretation that
would ever result in the payment for the property and
the vesting of the legal title in the defendant.
The case of Fisher vs. Bank of Spanish Fork, Utah,
1937, 74 P. 2d, 659: 93 U. 514 was a suit to foreclose a
crop mortgage on crops grown in 1935. The mortgage
provided that it was a mortgage lien on all crops planted
and grown in 1933, and until the debt secured by this
mortgage is fully paid.
The Court held that this was not a valid mortgage
lien on crops grown after 1933. After talking about the
indefiniteness and uncertainties the Court says at page
662.
"This is illustrated in another way by the rule against
perpetuities which affects property in esse. The
policy of the law is that it be freed from restrictions
against alienation after a life or lives in being and
21 years."
The only claim on defendant's theory that the language used in this case can be construed to fix a time for
payment of principal of the purchase price is "option to
pay an additional amount at any time."
There seems to be no conflict in the many authorities
that an option of this kind is void as it is against the rule
of perpetuities.
From Powell on Real Property, Volume V, Page
611-12, we quote:
"Options to purchase or to repurchase land unconnected with a lease commonly denominated options
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and gross have generally been held bad under the
common law rule against perpetuities when not restricted in durations so as to comply with the permissable period under rule. This result applies the
rule against perpetuities as it should be applied to
any future interest and specific property with social
advantages in permitting the type of interest or not
affirmativey proved to out weigh the social policy
of the rule favoring alienability."
In the case of Henderson vs. Bell, Kansas 1918, 173
Pac. 1124, Headnote One states:
"A contract giving an option to purchase real property without limiting the time in which the purchase
may be made is void for the reason that it violates
the rule against perpetuities."
In discussing this matter the Court says at page 1125.
"By the contract, if Bell should elect to sell the property he must first offer it to the Buchanans. The
contract, if enforceable, gives the Buchanans the
right to purchase the property at some future,
indefinite and unknown time, and Bell can be compelled to convey the property to the Buchanans at
such time and for the price named. Bell cannot sell
the property to any person without first offering it
to those holding under the contract. When sold
under the contract, the property must be sold at $65
an acre, although at that time it may be worth $1,000
an acre. Bell does not have absolute, uncontrolled
right to sell the property at any time that he may see
fit. It follows that the Buchanans and those holding
under them, either as assignees or heirs, would hold a
right to obtain an interest in the property running for
an indefinite period of time. That right would be
held in violation of the rule against perpetuity."
This rule was cited with favor in Beloit Bldg Co. vs.
Quinn et al, Kansas 1937, 66 P. 2d 549,552. which states:
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"If it was a mere option to purchase at some remote
time in the future, it would run headlong into the
rule against perpetuities and the option would have
been void." (citing cases)
The Restatement of the Property Division IV, Section
393 adopts the view that an option violates the rule against
perpetuities unless the time for exercising the option is
limited so as to conform to the rule against perpetuities.
There are many cases in California holding attempts
to create an interest in property void as against the rule.
See Sahlenders Estate, Cal. 1948, 201 P. 2d, 69; Johnstons estate, Cal. 1956, 299 P. 2d 892; Heards Estate, Cal.
1944 146 P. 2d, 725.
Betchard vs. Iverson, Wash. 1949 212 P. 2d. 783, was
a case construing a Will and the Court said at page 786.
"The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation
of future interest which, by possibility may not become vested within the life or lives in being at the
time of the testators death and 21 years thereafter.
Any limitation of a future interest which violates this
rule is void. The purpose of the rule is to prevent
the fettering of marketability of the property over
long period of time by indirect restraints upon alienation. It is not a rule of construction, but a positive
mandate of law to be applied irrespective of the
intention of the testator. The proper procedure to
determine the true construction of the Will just as
if there were no such thing as a rule against perpetuities and then to apply the rule rigorously in complete
disregard of the wishes or intentions of the testator."
The Estate of Annie Williams Lee, Wash., 299 P. 2d,
1066, Headnote 3 states:
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"If by any conceivable combination of circumstance
it is possible that the event on which the estate or
interest is limited may not occur within the period
prescribed in the rule against perpetuities the limitation is void."
POINT 3. THIS CONTRACT IS NOT A LEASE.
Defendant's counsel cites authorities apparently holding that the rules against perpetuities do not apply to long
time leases. The authorities that he cites apply generally
to oil and mineral leases or similar leases. We submit
that mineral leases ordinarily are not perpetual leases, but
their common provision provides that when production
is discontinued for a time, usually fixed, and the royalties
are paid thereunder, then the lease expires. There is
nothing in the language of this contract that even squints
at the proposition that the buyer should have a perpetual
lease or possession of the farm, or that this is an agreement to lease in perpetuity. The contract contains none
of the usual provisions of a lease; such as a covenant not
to commit waste, maintain the fence etc. No terms are
expressed whatever that the defendant was to have possession of the property unless he paid for it as a purchaser.
There are numerous cases cited that the mere fact
that a lease is for a longer period of 21 years does not
violate the rule. This reference to the citation of authorities finds no criticism from the plaintiffs. However, the
note cited in 66 A.L.R. 2d, 733, makes a distinction between leases for a longer period than a term of 21 years or
life, and a lease which is to take effect in the future at
some uncertain period of which only becomes effective
after the happening of some uncertain event. From this
note we cite the following at page 733-734:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

"The cases disclose uncertainties and to some extent
conclusions in regard to the manner in which the
common law n1le against perpetuities applies to leases
for years or for other fixed or defined terms. Some
of the difficulties are related to omissions to distinguish consistently in thought and terminology between
future leases m;d future terms of leases."
2. Leases in Futuro: "There can be doubt that
leases fall within the rule requiring that estates to vest
within the prescribed period, that is the period of
the common law rule against perpetuities. (Citing)
Haggerty vs. Oakland, 1958) 116 Cal. App. 2d, 407,
326 P. 2d, 957-66 A. L. R. 2d, 718."
"So a provision for a future lease which will not, or
may not vest in interest within the period of the
perpetuity of the rule is condemned by the rule."
The real trouble with defendants authorities, as far
as this case is concerned, is that this contract is not a
lease. It was never drawn as a lease and a lease was
never considered. The word lease is not to be found in
the contract. This is escrow contract for purchase of
land, in which the defendant agreed to purchase and the
plaintiffs agreed to sell the property therein described.
The controversy arises from the statement in the contract
''$1,000 each October 1st thereafter until the full purchase
price with interest on all deferred payments at the rate
of 4}f% per annum from January 1, 1960," have been paid,
should be construed to mean, "The Buyer is required to
pay $1,000 per year on the contract and nothing more."
This is the apparent interpretation that the Defendant
insists upon. Since the $1)000 would not pay the interest,
no title to the property agreed to be sold and purchased
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would ever pass. For that reason, the contract must fall
as in violation of the rule against perpetuities. If the
Defendant had been willing to accept Plaintiffs interpretation of contract, he would have been give 25 years in
which to pay for this property with a low rate of interest
of 4*%, which it is submitted is a very reasonable time in
which to make his payments. If it had been intended to
give a long time lease on this property, the document
would not have been drawn as a partial payment purchase price contract with a deed deposited in Escrow as
was done in this case. We therefore, suggest that the
argument of a long time present lease does not violate
the rule against perpetuities and has no application whatever in this case, is without merit:
By way of answer to the defendants brief, it is our
contention that the quotes therein have nothing to do
with the facts in this case. The defendant is attempting
to claim a present interest to buy this property by reason
of his option to pay more whenever he feels like paying
more. The interpretation insisted upon by the defendant
in this case does violate the rule against perpetuities in
that defendant's title to that property would never vest
because he would never pay for it.
The trial court was clearly correct in refusing to
adopt the interpretation sought to be placed upon the
contract and insisted upon by the defendant.
CONCLUSION
The contract in question was a contract intended to
be a contract of sale and not a lease. No court should
look upon the facts of this case and read into this contract

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15or make a new contract for the parties that would permit
the defendants to retain this property perpetually without
paying the interest provided for in the contract or any
part of the principal by merely paying $1,000.00 per year.
The Judgment should be affirmed with costs awarded to
the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRIS AND, HARRIS
By M. C. Harris,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
and Respondent
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah
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